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CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS: FROM ESTABLISHMENT TO RADICALISM

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Abstract: Until recent times, history witnessed repeated calls where those in charge positioned themselves as the defenders of religion against any danger and deviation, while condemning the state or society for its deviation, which made reform necessary. This situation prevailed until the dawn of the modern age, where the domain of Islam went through many reforms aimed at the reconstruction of what had been destroyed in religion and the revival of what had been abolished. To compliance this, many revivalist movements had been established, yet in post-colonial phenomena, the tendency of fanaticism militancy is observed among these revivalist movements. In this paper, it is tried to find out the causes and external sources that bound these movements to Radicalism in perspective of contemporary global political tendencies of the western powers.

Key words: *Radicalism, Islamic Movements, Western approaches,*

Any group of Islamic believers who have ideological objective try to develop the Islamic thought and the reconstruction of individual and society establish a movement. In pursuing their views on the rehabilitation of Islam in contemporary times, and in trying to find an honorable place for Muslims in the contemporary world, these organized groups begun to pose a challenge to the status quo. In a specific and limited sense, examples of these groups are known as the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world, and Jam'at-i-Islami¹ in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Kashmir. There are other groups and movements as the Naurs¹ movement of Sudan or the Rif¹ h party in Turkey, the Islamic Tendency Movement in Tunisia, the FIS in Algeria, etc. It is also a fact that whenever the opportunity was available for any Islamic movement, it showed its deep roots within the society, as it is admitted in the Martin Kramer's anthology:

Since Islamists combine modern organizational discipline, a protean communal identity and pragmatic tactics, their effort to convert their strength in civil society into electoral power has been remarkably successful. In Algeria and Turkey, achieving power by liberal democratic means was blocked by the secular military alliances with tragic results in the former. When blocked from participating in electoral politics, as in Egypt, Islamists shifted to organizations within civil society and won control of many professional associations, only to be put under judicial control by the state.¹

The Islamic movements seem to distinguish themselves from the general population by claiming Islam for themselves, as if they are entitled to issue judgments on society's inability to live by the values of Islam. They establish themselves as the authority in charge of reminding, calling and sometimes forcing people to address such inability. Some groups react to such claims by rejecting them, even though they may accept the characterization of society as negligent of Islam. They also reject the claim that the Islamic movements are the leaders of the hoped-for awakening².

Another reaction completely rejects the bases and the meaning of the claims by saying that societies are really Islamic and do not need any group to remind them of their religion. Conversely, some secularists concur that the role of religion in social life has greatly weakened and that the Islamic movements try to revive it, although they believe that such an action is impossible or in principle undesirable.

Establishment of Islamic Movements: Historical Association

Historically, the Islamic experience has witnessed continuous activity on all levels to achieve this objective. In Islam, many scientific and cultural movements have emerged, starting with the collection and writing down of the Qur'¹ n, and then the establishment and development of Islamic sciences such

as jurisprudence, ḥadīth, theology, the Arabic language, translation and transmission of sciences. There was also the rise of theological and juristic schools and intellectual and spiritual movements such as Sufism and philosophy.

Politically, there have been many movements, confrontations and uprisings, starting with the wars of apostasy and the revolution against ‘Uthmān bin ‘Affān and the al-Khawārij movement, then the revolution of Sayyid al-Husayn ibn-‘Alī, the movement of Al-Mukhtar al-Thaqafi who established the first Shi‘ite state in Iraq in the year 66 of the Hijra, the movement of ‘Abd Allāh al-Zubayr, the revolution of ‘Abd al-Rahmān bin al-Ash‘ath, then the movement of Zayd bin ‘Alī and many others. Also included are the ‘Abbāsīd revolution, as well as the states that they brought about such as the Buwaihids, Fātimīds and Ismīlīs.

All these movements and uprisings emerged in the name of combating deviations from the ideal model that the Prophet and his Caliphs established for the people, and were aimed at regaining the purity of that model. We should not forget, in this context, the continuous jihād to defend Islam against its enemies in the outside world, to expand the territories of its domain, or to defend it against any aggression, as well as to force out those who have succeeded in occupying the land of Islam. Thus, the phenomenon of revival and renewal and related claims are not new, and has not emerged only in this age.³

Until recent times, history witnessed repeated calls where those in charge positioned themselves as the defenders of religion against any danger and deviation, while condemning the state or society for its deviation, which made reform necessary. This situation prevailed until the dawn of the modern age, where the domain of Islam went through many reforms aimed at the reconstruction of what had been destroyed in religion and the revival of what had been abolished.

The representatives of such trends are the movement of Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhāb in Saudi Arabia (1703-1791), the Shah Walīullah in India (1702-1762) then his successor Sayyid Ahmad Shahīd (1831), the al-Sanūsīyya movement in North Africa (1859-1878), the Mahdiyya in Sudan (1881-1898), the movement of Dan Fodio in Nigeria (1754-1817) and others in many different lands of the Islamic world.

The movements of mostly political nature, however, were preceded and followed by many spiritual and social movements. Examples of the latter are the many Sufi orders that were established and spread, such as al-Khilwīyya, al-Iḍrīyya, al-Tijrīyya, al-Sumrīyya, and al-Khṭmīyya in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, as well as older Sufi orders, such as al-Naqshbandiyya, Shādhiliyya and al-Qādiriyya that were revived, and still others that spread widely.

While investigating the expedition of Islamic movements from spirituality to confrontation, or in modern language, from traditionalism to radicalism, the primary reason was the colonialism, which was a completely new experience for the Islamic nation. It had confronted many crises and trials before, including the invasion of the Moguls and the Crusaders, the loss of Spain and defeats in other wars, struggles, collapses, and the internal crumbling of its ideal system. However, none of these disasters affected the self-confidence of the nation as much as European domination. During the darkest periods of the Mogul Empire and the Crusaders' invasions, or in the calamity that followed the fall of Spain, the question "who was right?" was never entertained. The reasons were that the Moguls did not provide an alternative worldview of life and the universe, using only violent force to subjugate. Thus, the Muslim nation did not face an internal schism because of these confrontations and did not doubt its inevitable victory over its enemies. In fact, this victory would be massive and complete, militarily, politically, culturally and morally. This is why radical reconsideration of the experiences, ideas and practices was not seriously entertained, and the reaction was limited to repeating the well-established notion that the nation would not succeed in the future except by that which had made the nation succeed at its inception.

In this situation, the change and awareness gradually started during the last three decades of the 19th century when the Muslims consciously pondered over the need of religious revival as well as political strength. But the history states that dilemma of that activism remained because if any movement emerged to reform the religion, it neglected the international scenario as in the case of Mahdī movement of Sudan in 1881. On the contrary, if any group strived to counter the external invaders, it ignored the basis of religion as in the case of 'Urabī revolution of Egypt in 1882. Until the 19th century began when contemporary Islamic movements surfaced and began to take their form within new frameworks.

These movements are established in the environment of modernity and as a response to it. They are also Islamic in the sense that they have selected an Islamic response to the challenges of modernity that is based on Islamic authority. They do not react, like other movements, out of the logic of mere effectiveness and do not depend on values, ideologies or authorities other than those of Islam; the movement of Jamī l Al-Dīn al-Afghānī is the suitable example of this phenomenon.

It is true that al-Afghānī was one of most distinguished reformers of the 19th century. He was a prominent and inspired personality that combined intellectual depth, leadership abilities and awareness of the dangers that confronted the Muslim nation as well as the changes around it⁴. He also tried to combine in his approach the intellectual educational method with direct political activity. Thus, he was a scholar among politicians and a politician

among scholars⁵. Although Al-Afghānī was the product of a traditional Islamic environment and immersed in its sciences, he was greatly aware of the spheres of traditional Islamic thought, for example, the philosophical and social thinking of Ibn Khaldūn. Similarly, Hasan al-Bannā and sayed Mawdūdī's movements are the other two worth mentioning.

Nevertheless, many reasons have been given for the widespread existence of these movements in Islamic societies, especially after they gave rise to "the Islamic awakening" in the 1970s and 1980s. Although, some Western analysts saw in this success the surge of the petro-dollar and its impact⁶, while others concurred that the reason was a combination of pride after the War of 1973, dismay because of the failure of secular governments and ideologies, and the crisis of identity and inferiority complex towards the West⁷. Still others justified this development by referring to different crises, from the global economic collapse and the recession of 1929, through to the economic and political crises that hit the Islamic world in the 1970s and 1980s.⁸

What reason would be, but this is fact that every Islamic movement emerge with the notion of '*return to Islam*'. Some analysts are on the view that the return to Islam is a return to what is natural, and see it only as an ideological difference. This difference is based on the observation that the concepts which Islamic movements promote merely are not same all times. Adherents to this view add that the fact that the leaders of the Islamic movements are mainly from the modern sector that is influenced by the West, and sometimes they can not preach their followers the proper teachings of Islam, so that they adopt violence to achieve their objectives.

Programs and Objectives

The conditions and circumstances of the establishment of the Islamic movements are the main factors that determine their objectives and the formation of their intellectual framework. Here too, analyses vary and depend on the perspective and understanding of the analyst concerning the motivations and conditions of their establishment. Those who say that the movements are natural products of partial modernization and immature secularization perceive the movements' thought as an expression of the insecurity of their foundation, the wretchedness of their reality, and as reflecting "the thought of poverty and the poverty of thought,"⁹ as one of their critics puts it. According to other analysts, they reflect the grievances and despair of the classes that have been transcended by modernity and marginalized by the class struggle.

There are also those who see these movements as a modern phenomenon, since relating their thought to an imagined Islamic heritage is somewhat like inventing a new heritage. Every movement wants to restore the Islamic law despite the interpretations of Islam that what kind of Islam it want to restore. Disregarding this issue, the common demands of the contemporary Islamic

movements can be summarized in the following points:

- ❖ The call to regain the influence and authority of Islam in the world;
- ❖ Such an objective cannot be achieved except by returning to true Islam that the Muslims of this age have deserted. This return must be comprehensive and all aspects of Muslim life, starting with politics and ending with personal matters, should be subjected to the authority of Islamic law;
- ❖ Regaining the authority of the *sharia* is not possible without establishing a true Islamic state, where governance is for God alone; and
- ❖ The task of regaining the authority of Islam is a sacred mission that permits the use of any method, including [legal] violence and ploy.¹⁰

Some experts view the emergence of the Islamic movements as a restoration of specific historical Islamic orientations, especially the Hanbalī trend that was embodied in the ideas of Ibn-e-Taymiyya.¹¹ The view of modern Islamic movements as a rebirth of the Hanbalī thought sheds light on another angle that analysts have explored — the attempt to link the modern Islamic movements with the history of Islamic reform through generations. John Voll distinguishes between two trends of Islamic reform¹², one that depends on the centrality of the text, the other that depends on the centrality of the inspiring personality as being representative of the sacred authority. The first trend generally represents the traditional Sunni schools, in addition to the Khawārij, while the other trend is represented by Shi‘ite schools and Sufi orders. In later periods, we can refer to the Wahhābiyya movement as representing the first trend, and the Mahdīyya and Sufi revivalism movements as representing the second.

The orientation of the Islamic movements and their demands are precise in one point and that is the imposition of the authority of the *sharia*¹³, otherwise they would readily challenge the ruling authorities and the dominant social traditions. The Islamic movements ask their governments to implement the *sharia* instead of secular systems, which those states adopted from non-Islamic sources. They call for Islamic unity against division and for independence from foreign influence instead of subordination. Socially, these movements direct their strongest criticism at the new habits such as food, relations between the sexes, arts and literature that resulted from Western influence. They call for the use of the authority of the state to stop such habits. On the level of international relations, they consider the call for Islamic unity to be pivotal, in addition to fighting colonialism, foreign influence and Zionism and supporting Islamic states and minorities that are targeted by strong enemies.

It is also noticed that there are differences between the priorities of one movement and another. The movement of the Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, was established from its founders' awareness of the people moving away from Islam, either intentionally, as is the case of the rich classes that are

affected by the West, or unintentionally, as is the case of the majority of people that lack awareness and education¹⁴. Early on, the leader of the movement warned against the British political, military and economic influence, and prioritized the fight against it.

The priority of Islamizing society and fighting colonialism led to a focus on the role of the state and political action. The issue of Palestine played a decisive role in the orientation of the movement, especially with regard to political mobilization and the use of military action, which had an impact on the future of the Islamic movements.

Sources of Radicalism in the Islamic Movements

Undoubtedly, Islamic movements have become an important part of the political and social sectors of the Muslim world today. Their role has expanded to the cultural and civilizational spheres as well. Most of them are working within the political framework of their respective countries and wherever these movements are suppressed to serve their nations or to counter any invader, they may adopt some violent way. These organizations, however, represent a small segment of the Islamic movements.

On contrary, every kind of Islamic movements has been portrayed in Western media as representing a political and cultural threat that has alternately been called “Islamic Radicalism”, “the Islamic Threat”, “the green threat” and “the Islamic march”. Moreover, it has become common to find expression such as “the bloody borders of Islam” which was firstly described by Samuel Huntington in the early nineties, or the “Islamic bomb”.¹⁵

The international media misinterprets the image of Islamic movements with focusing on a few little extremist groups and portrays them as the model of Islamic movements. The process of reform is considered as the integral part of any nation’s history for its existence. Many movements on the ground of Islam were emerged for this very purpose, but modern media is not ready to accept these reformist movements as well. This rejection by the West based on the fear of Islamic reform, because Islamic reform means the comprehensiveness of Islam and its validity as a complete life system that is not acceptable for the Western extremists.

This Western extremism, along with some local researchers of the oriental approach, viewed many phenomena as evidence of the spread Islamic radicalism, including the youth going regularly to mosques, the growing of beards, the wearing of Islamic dress, young and old women wearing the veil, and the emergence of many Islamic groups that demanded the implementation of the *Sharia* in society. It should be noted that such phenomena should be natural ones in any Islamic society, but they are being classified under "Radicalization," a term implying extremism and excess in the implementation of religious rules, and intolerance and stagnation in dealing with all matters.

John Esposito condemns this Western attitude with suggesting that an honest

effort is required to examine the real case of Islamic movements, he argues:

Islam and Islamic movements constitute a religious and ideological alternative or challenge and in some instance a potential danger to Christianity and the West. However, distinguishing between a religious or ideological alternative or challenge and a direct political threat requires walking the fine line between myth and reality, between the unity of Islam and the diversity of its multiple and complex manifestations in the world today, between the violent actions of the few and the legitimate aspirations and policies of the many. Unfortunately, American policymakers, like the media, have too often proved surprisingly myopic, viewing the Muslim world and Islamic movements as a monolith and seeing them solely in terms of extremism and terrorism. ... It fails to do justice to the complex realities of the Muslim world and can undermine relations between the West and Islam.¹⁶

Thus, the Islamic movements can be viewed as social movements that seek to bring about change in society and its institutions. There are many academic studies and social theories on this matter that seek to define the concept and nature of social movements and the causes for their emergence, as it has been discussed in the previous chapter. They also seek to analyze their ideological discourse and the symbols that they use. They explore the internal interactions of these movements, their transformation and their relations with the existing regimes¹⁷. While one can recognize the specific nature of the Islamic movement, it shares many manifestations with other social movements, and therefore we can benefit from these studies in our analysis of the nature of Islamic movements and the reasons why some adopt moderate methods and others extremism and violence.

On the other hand, there is non-religious, secular and governmental extremism also exists. For example, secular extremism, it calls on many political regimes to dry up the springs of religiosity and extremism in culture, education and teaching methodologies. This includes the closing of religious schools and madrassahs, the closing of the channels of legitimate activity for Islamic organizations and Islamic groups and sometimes the promulgation of laws that prohibit the Muslim from practicing his religious right, such as the law prohibiting the veil in official institutions and setting up parties on religious grounds. Such an animosity to religion in society does not even happen in Western societies¹⁸ that officially adopt secularism such as the United States of America or France.

Part of the extremism of the political regimes is the excessive use of unjustified force against their political opponents and religious extremists. The state has laws and regulations that define the means and methods of dealing with "the outlaws." In most cases, these laws provide sufficient means to deal

with and repress the opponents. The incident of L-71 Masjid (2005) in Islamabad is appropriate example of such political extremism, under which Gen. Musharraf tried to radicalize the students of L-71 Masjid according to his secular mindset. Nevertheless, the state's resort to excessive violence that the law does not allow is another form of unacceptable and unjustified extremism. Furthermore, it encourages "the outlaws" to insist on reacting with equal violence.

The use of unjustified route of violence by the states make depressed the religious minded people and gradually the mistreatment of the governments compel them to react to satisfy their inner self. This confrontation then changes into the combat struggle between the people and the state. This is basic internal cause of the emergence of radicalism within the Muslim countries.

Radicalism and extremism has many diverse and interwoven causes, and Yusuf Al-Qaradawi mentions many causes for the extremism of some Islamic movements¹⁹. Some of these are related to a lack of understanding of true religion, while others are related to the environment that the movements work within. Examples of the former are the weak understanding of true religion, the tendency to understand the texts literally, preoccupation with peripheral instead of central issues, over-emphasis on prohibition, the confusion of concepts (belief and unbelief), pursuing what is ambiguous while not adhering to what is clearly prohibited, as well as a lack of knowledge of history, reality and the rules of the universe (like the concepts of gradual change and predestination). Examples of the causes related to the environments of the specific Islamic movement include the alienation of Islam in the land of Islam, the public attack and secret conspiracy against the Islamic nation, prohibiting free call to comprehensive Islam, and resorting to violence and repression to resist the Islamic movements.

Many Western analysts, Esposito is one of them, refer the roots of religious extremism back to Sayyid Qutb and his conclusion that society reneged from Islam and thus has fallen into a state of *jahiliyya* because of its refusal of divine governance and its preference for human governance. Qutb called for the foundation of a unique group of believers that separates itself existentially from the *jahiliyya* society and attempts to change it radically by whatever means it sees fit.²⁰ But let us examine the real basis, which compel the Muslims to react.

Humiliation of the Islamic sources

Any Muslim may compromise on the repression and unkindness to himself by anyone, but he cannot compromise on two beliefs; the Qur'an and the persona of his beloved prophet Muhammad ﷺ. Whenever, any effort to character assassination of these two, the Muslims reacted aggressively. Some Westerners

irritate the Muslims by humiliating Qurʾān or the Prophet Muḥammad ﷺ. This creates a tension and agitation among the Muslims of the world which later propagated in the media as Islamic radicalism or extremism. Ismāʿīl Ibrāhīm Nawwāb, A Saudi scholar, presents these feelings in his words:

The polemical campaign started by John of Damascus²¹ was now resumed. Fuelled by the ever-volatile mixture of crass ignorance and deep fear of a victorious Islam, the polemics became intensely virulent and vituperative and a totally false, grotesquely distorted and highly offensive image of the Prophet and of his message was propagated. The Qurʾān was represented not just as a pirated version, but a mutilated version, of Jewish and Christian scriptures, and therefore false; in fact a revelation that came after Christianity must be false *ipso facto*. Islam was portrayed as a religion of violence, idolatry, and licentiousness. Muslims were alleged to worship idols of Muḥammad and pagan deities. The Prophet was depicted as a cunning politician, a sexual libertine, an impostor, a hatemonger, and the Anti-Christ. The painful effects of these calumnies can be witnessed to this day.²²

Colonialism and Interference

The second reason for the contemporary radicalism in Islamic world is the aftermath of the western colonialism in 20th century and the interference currently into the Muslim regimes. By the nineteenth century, Esposito explains²³ that, a clear shift of power had occurred, as the decline of Muslim fortunes reversed the relationship of Islam to the West. Increasingly, Muslims found themselves on the defensive in the face of European expansion. Whereas the primary challenge to Islamic identity and unity in the 18th and 19th centuries was generally seen as internal, the real threat of the West was not experienced until the late nineteenth and early 20th century. It constituted a singular challenge to Islam politically, economically, morally, and culturally. European colonialism and imperialism threatened Muslim political and religio-cultural identity and history.

The impact of Western rule and modernization raised new questions and challenged time-honored beliefs and practices. With the dawn of European domination of the Muslim world, the image, if not always the reality, of Islam as an expansive worldwide force had been shattered.

The map of the Muslim world after World War I revealed the extent of foreign dominance: the French in North, West, and equatorial Africa and the Levant (Lebanon and Syria); the British in Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian subcontinent; and in Southeast Asia, the British in Malaya, Singapore, and Brunei, and the Dutch in Indonesia. Where

Muslims retained power, in Turkey and Iran, they were constantly on the defensive against the political and economic ambitions of the British, French, and Russians, whose inroads and machinations threatened their independence and stability.

On this root of confrontation, Esposito comments:

Muslim views of the West and responses to its power and ideas varied from rejection and confrontation to admiration and imitation. However, the prevailing mood was one of conflict and competition. For many, colonialism conjured up memories of the Crusades; the European challenge and aggression was but another phase of militant Christianity's war with Islam; Europe was the enemy that threatened both the faith of Islam and the political life of the Muslim community.²⁴

In the light of above mentioned it would be right opinion that colonialism was experienced as a threat to Muslim identity and faith. Implicit in its policies and explicit in the statements of many government officials and missionaries was the belief that Europe's expansion and domination were due to its inherent Christian culture superiority. Educating the "natives" in the language, history, and social sciences of the West and Christian virtues was part of an "enlightened" policy to civilize. One did not have to look far for statements which substantiated the worst Muslim fears. As a result, the struggle against European colonialism often appropriated the rhetoric of a war between Christendom and Islam.

Bernard Lewis admits the foreign invasion as the root cause of Islamic decline, he stated in his famous article, *The Roots of Muslim Rage*:

For a long time now there has been a rising tide of rebellion against this Western paramountcy, and a desire to reassert Muslim values and restore Muslim greatness. The Muslim has suffered successive stages of defeat. The first was his loss of domination in the world, to the advancing power of Russia and the West. The second was the undermining of his authority in his own country, through an invasion of foreign ideas and laws and ways of life and sometimes even foreign rulers or settlers, and the enfranchisement of native non-Muslim elements. The third -- the last straw -- was the challenge to his mastery in his own house, from emancipated women and rebellious children.²⁵

First two reasons, stated by Bernard Lewis, are comprehensible but the last one of insurrection of the Muslim youth is out of the context of Muslims' history, because, there is no example found that the Muslim youth ever agitated in the favor of western rule. This is wrongly reported by Bernard Lewis.

Actually, Europe came not only with its armies of bureaucrats and soldiers

but also with its Christian missionaries. The double threat of colonialism was that of the crown and the cross. Muslim responses to the challenge of colonialism were on four diverse: rejection; withdrawal: secularism and Westernization; and Islamic modernism. Total rejection and withdrawal, later considered as a radical attempt. In modern times, every Muslim who reject the Western culture or rituals or any Islamic movement which projects anti-western agenda is considered radical.

Superpowers left but their effects and colonialist repercussions have changed the whole Muslim lands into the battlefields, in which the wars and conflicts emerged all over the globe in the form of interstate wars, liberation struggles, secessionist movements, civil wars, insurrections, insurgencies, and terrorist acts. Notably, all warfare is on the ground of Muslim lands. Have a look the episodes of confrontation:

Interstate wars:

- Arab-Israeli wars
- Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)
- Gulf War (1991)

Liberation Struggles:

- Palestine (The First Intifada 1987-1993; The al-Aqsa Intifada, started in 2000)
- Afghanistan-Soviet War (1979-1989)

NATO Invasions:

- In Afghanistan (Since 2001)
- In Iraq (Since 2003)

Secessionist Movements:

- Southern Sudan (1980s-2005)
- Kashmir (since 1989)—this can also be classified as an interstate conflict
- Bosnia (1992-1995)
- Chechnya (since 1994)
- Philippines (since 1995)
- Kosovo (1996-1999)
- Dagestan (since 1999)
- Indonesia (since 2000)
- Thailand (since 2004)

Civil wars:

- Algeria (1991-1998)

Insurrections:

- Afghanistan: The Northern Alliance versus The Taliban (1994-2001)

Insurgencies:

- Egypt (1992-1997 and from 2004)
- Uzbekistan (since 1998-1999)
- Afghanistan after the Taliban (since 2002)
- Iraq after Saddam (since 2003)
- Pakistan (since 2003)
- Saudi Arabia (since May 12, 2003)

Sectarian and communal conflicts:

- India (decades)
- Pakistan (decades)
- Nigeria (since 2000)
- Darfur, Sudan (since 2003) and Nuba, Sudan (since 1992)
- Somalia (since 2006).²⁶

This picture evidently shows the anxious repercussions and results of foreign interference into the Muslims' states even after the colonial era.

Oppression and Brutality in the Muslim lands

Above mentioned figures represent the strategic situation of the Muslim lands, and the recent American invasion has fanned the flame. The depressed Muslims now believe this aggressive Western attitude as an open brawl.

In this case, the West would understand the complexities of the Muslims societies and the demands of Islamic movements. The causes of the resurgence and reaction vary by country and region, but, in Esposito's opinion, there are common threads besides the inadequate interruption into the domestic political matters, which are widespread feelings of failure and loss of identity in many Muslim societies, as well as failed political systems and economies. Overcrowded cities with insufficient social support systems, high unemployment rates, government corruption, a growing gap between rich and poor, and the breakdown of traditional religious and social values plagued many nations.²⁷

Israel's crushing victory over the combined forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day war symbolized the depth of Arab and Muslim impotence and the failure of modern nation-states in the Muslim world. Israel seized major pieces of territory, including the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan. The loss of Jerusalem, the third holiest city of Islam, which embraces major Muslim holy sites, the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsā Mosque, was particularly devastating to Muslims around the world, making Palestine and the liberation of Jerusalem an Islamic, not just an Arab or Palestinian, issue.²⁸

The fact is that, the Muslims do not hate West or America, but rather the interventionist policy of the West. The presence of U.S. troops in the Muslim heartland, Saudi Arabia, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, was the supposed

reason behind the Sept. 11 attacks. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq are the main reason for the radicalization of the Muslim societies, which urges them to react in the same way.

The solution of this radical wave among the Islamic movements lies in the West's views. If Western powers continue to defend the unjust status of the Middle East supporting Israel in the name of an illusory or fleeting stability, Islam will be a threat and radicalization will remain continue. However if the Western powers begin to appreciate the legitimacy of grievances in the Muslim world, the West and Islamic movements will get along peacefully.

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- ¹⁶ John L. Esposito, *Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*, p. 5
- ¹⁷ Emad al-Din Shahin, *Extremism and Moderation in Islamic Movements: Causes, Motives and Repercussions*, p. 101
- ¹⁸ 'Emad al-Din Shahin, dealt with this issue in detail, see his article "Extremism and Moderation in Islamic Movements: Causes, Motives and Repercussions", pp. 97 - 101
- ¹⁹ Yusuf Al-Qardawi, *Al-Sahwat al-Islamiyya bayna al-Juhud wa al-Tatarruf*, Kitab al-Ulama, Qatar, 1984, pp. 23 - 26
- ²⁰ See: John L. Esposito, *Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*, pp.126-128 ; Bernard Lewis, *The Crises of Islam*, p. 69
- ²¹ For a detailed study of John of Damascus, the first architect and coryphaeus of the critique of Islam and the Prophet, and of the church leader's family, religious and Umayyad background and especially for the texts of his polemics against Islam in English translation, see Daniel J. Sahas, *John of Damascus: The "Heresy of the Ishmaelites"* (Leiden: 1972); for John of Damascus in general and his polemical position against Islam in particular, see the pertinent parts of the five-volume monumental work on Christianity (1971-1989) by Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*. Vol. 2: *The Spirit of Eastern Christendom [600-1700]* (Chicago: 1974), especially pp. 227-242; also B. Kotter, "John Damascene, St.," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (Palatine, IL: 1967); reprinted 1981; 17 vols., Vol. VQ, pp. 1047-1049; Herbert Thurston and Donald Attwater, eds., *Butler's Lives of the Saints* (New York: 1956), pp. 689-691.
- ²² Ismā'īl Ibrāhīm Nawwāb, *Muslims and the West in History*, in *Muslims and the West: Encounter and Dialogue*, Edited by: Zafar Ishāq Ansāri & John L. Esposito, Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad, 2001, pp. 11-12
- ²³ Esposito, *Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*, p. 51
- ²⁴ Ibid., p. 52
- ²⁵ Bernard Lewis, *The Roots of Muslim Rage*, The Atlantic, September, 1990
- ²⁶ Details taken from: Jalil Roshandel & Sharon Chandha, *Jihad and International Security*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, pp. 8 - 9
- ²⁷ John L. Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, p. 83

²⁸ Ibid., p. 83

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